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FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: DOES THE MEDIA




M UCH HAS BEEN written over the years about the
First Amendment's free press clause, which states
that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom ... of the press."' The literature attempts to isolate
the purpose and interpretation of the clause for use in
modern society. Currently, press rights include a right to
gather news and, in some circumstances, a special right of
access to places that is not granted to the general public.
The issue analyzed in this Comment is whether that spe-
cial right of access extends to aviation disaster sites.
An overview of the press' historical role in society as
well as the evolution of case law defining general media
rights is necessary to determine if the press should have
access to air crash sites. Additionally, a summary of cases
that specifically involve disasters and accidents will assist
in establishing the current status of the press' right of ac-
cess to aviation incidents. An analysis of those cases also
reveals a general standard of review that will aid in formu-
lating a qualified right of access to crash sites.
This Comment, therefore, begins with a look at the
traditional role of newsgathering in the self-governance
' U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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process.2 The development of the fundamental view that
the press' rights do not exceed those of the general pub-
lic 3 and modem cases that imply a special right of access 4
are then presented. The Comment then focuses upon
disaster and accident cases to determine both the trend of
such decisions as well as the method of analysis utilized.5
Finally, the Comment incorporates the identified standard
of review into some general guidelines that may be used
to evaluate if and when the press should have a special
right of access to crash sites.6
I. THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN SELF-GOVERNANCE
Although the First Amendment is traditionally associ-
ated with the right to disseminate information, a broader
interpretation of the amendment protects the entire new-
sgathering process. Support for this newsgathering right
follows from the premise that the First Amendment was
designed to encourage self-governance, which necessarily
requires access to information and sources. When access
is restricted, information is not secured from competing
sources, resulting in uninformed and less meaningful de-
cision-making.8 The right to gather news, therefore, is in-
2 For a discussion of the traditional newsgathering role, see infra notes 7-12 and
accompanying text.
For a discussion of the fundamental view of press access rights, see infra notes
13-61 and accompanying text.
4 For a discussion of the modern special access cases, see infra notes 62-137 and
accompanying text.
-1 For a discussion of disaster and accident cases and the method of analysis
used, see infra notes 138-196 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the proposed guidelines, see infra notes 197-210 and ac-
companying text.
7 See generally J. BARRON & C. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE
PRESS (1979); Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
838 (1971); Note, The Rights of the Public and Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1505 (1974); Note, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
109 (1977).
See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960).
Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are
denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbe-
lief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result
must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good.
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extricably connected with the proposition that the press
should have special access rights under the First
Amendment. 9
Proponents have formulated several theories in support
of this special access proposition. For example, the sepa-
rate press clause in the Constitution combined with socie-
tal developments, such as the public's increased reliance
upon the media for information, supports the proposition
of special access rights for the press."0 Another argument
is that the press plays a structural role in the constitu-
tional scheme by acting as a check on governmental
power abuses.'I Finally, a related theory is that the press,
It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the
First Amendment to the Constitution is directed.
Id. (emphasis in original).
9 See generally Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731 (1977);
Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Free-
dom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975); Stewart, "Or Of the Press", 26 HAS-
TINGS LJ. 631 (1975); Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a "Preferred
Position", 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977).
10 Collins, The Press Clause Construed in Context: Thejournalists' Right of Access to
Places, 52 Mo. L. REV. 751, 765 (1987). Collins argues:
The text of the [F]irst [A]mendment, by treating the press or media
in a separate clause, clearly supports a slight preference for the me-
dia. History buttresses this view. The state constitutions of the era
are focused on press protection.... Methods of constitutional inter-
pretation enhance this view by clearly demonstrating the propriety,
the legitimacy and the need for granting the media a slight prefer-
ence under the press clause of the (F]irst [A]mendment.
Id.
Note, Press Passes & Trespasses: Newsgathering on Private Property, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1298, 1315 (1984). Justice Stewart was one of the primary proponents of
this theory, which he stated as follows:
tT]he Free Press guarantee is, in essence a structural provision of the
Constitution. Most of the other provisions in the bill of rights pro-
tect specific liberties of specific rights of individuals .... In contrast,
the Free Press Clause extends protection to an institution. The pub-
lishing business is, in short, the only organized private business that
is given explicit constitutional protection.
In setting up the three branches of the Federal Government, the
Founders deliberately created an internally competitive system. ...
The primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free
press was ... to create a fourth institution outside the government
as an additional check on the three official branches.
Stewart, supra note 9, at 633-34 (emphasis in original).
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as a surrogate for the public, provides the public with the
information necessary to assist them in preventing gov-
ernmental abuses. 12 Under this theory, the press does not
act as a check but only as a source of information that al-
lows the public to control abuses.
A review of the relevant case law indicates that the
Supreme Court implicitly recognizes that, at least in some
circumstances, the press has a constitutionally protected
special right of access. Acknowledging that such a right
does exist, questions will arise as to when and for whom
the right should be recognized. And, if the right is recog-
nized, a determination must be made as to what limits can
validly be placed upon that right. Finally, an additional
issue concerns whether the special right of access can be
extended from judicial and administrative proceedings
into such areas as emergencies arising from disasters and
accidents, particularly aviation crashes. The analysis be-
low focuses upon these issues and necessarily begins with
the cases establishing the press' fundamental rights and
the standard of review.
II. HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE PRESS' RIGHT OF ACCESS
A. Fundamental View: Press Has No Greater Rights Than
Public
The development of the press' access rights began from
a cautious position acknowledging the need for First
Amendment protections while severely limiting the press'
newsgathering ability. With Branzburg v. Hayes,'" the gen-
eral principle that "[n]ewsmen have no constitutional
right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the
general public is excluded" became a firmly entrenched
standard for determining the media's right of access to in-
21 Note, supra note 11, at 1318. "Like the checking-function theory, this view
also concerns the abuses of power by government, but it focuses on the role of the
public in preventing such abuses. Under this theory, the press serves as a medium
by which the public receives the information necessary to perform its preventative
function." Id.
,', 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (5-4 decision).
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formation and places.' 4 The same Court, however, simul-
taneously recognized that without some First Amendment
protection, the freedom of the press guarantee might be
"eviscerated." 
'5
In Branzburg, the Court held that requiring reporters to
divulge the identity of confidential sources to a grand jury
in furtherance of a criminal investigation did not violate
the First Amendment.' 6 The Court ruled that the press
was protected from official harassment by a good faith
standard applied to the initiation of grand jury proceed-
ings. That is, a court will grant a motion to quash or a
protective order when the need for privileged information
is only remotely related to the purpose of the law enforce-
ment investigation. Such unjustified interference with a
reporter's news sources may constitute official harassment
of the press. 17
The dissenting justices in Branzburg, however,
presented counterarguments that support a special role
for the press. Justice Douglas believed that a free press
occupies a special position under the First Amendment
protections.' Requiring newsmen to reveal their sources
'4 Id. at 684-85; see also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (holding that a
failure to validate a citizen's passport for travel to Cuba for purposes of investigat-
ing the government's foreign policies did not to violate the First Amendment be-
cause "[tihe right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained
right to gather information").
'.- Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681, 684. More specifically, in an often cited passage,
the Court stated that "it [is not] suggested that news gathering does not qualify
for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681.
w Id. at 707-08.
17 Id. The Court acknowledged First Amendment protections but suggested
such limits were met by imposing a good faith standard. So, "newsgathering is
not without its First Amendment protections, and grand jury investigations if in-
stituted or conducted other than in good faith, would pose wholly different issues
for resolution under the First Amendment." Id. at 707.
, Id. at 721 (Douglas, J:, dissenting). In support of his contention that the
press occupies a special role, Justice Douglas stated:
The press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme, not
to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored
class, but to bring fulfillment to the public's right to know. The right
to know is crucial to the governing powers of the people.... Knowl-
edge is essential to informed decisions.
19901 645
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to a grand jury, according to Douglas, would inhibit the
public's right to know by increasing both the source's fear
of exposure and a reporter's fear of accountability. 19 Jus-
tice Stewart believed that the majority's holding would
undermine the press' independence and diminish its abil-
ity to perform functions that were constitutionally pro-
tected.2 0  Therefore, the Court was not unified in its
perception of the newsgathering rights of the press under
the First Amendment.
Over the course of several decisions involving the
press' right of access to prisons, the Court continued to
limit the press' access rights by holding in accordance
with the narrower view that the press was properly ex-
cluded in all cases in which the public was also legiti-
mately excluded.2 I For example, in Pell v. Procunier,2 the
Court upheld a regulation of the California Department
of Corrections that denied media interviews with specific
Id.
19 Id. Justice Douglas argued that forced disclosure of news sources would im-
pede the press in its role as agent for the public because "[lear of exposure will
cause dissidents to communicate less openly to trusted reporters. And, fear of
accountability will cause editors and critics to write with more restrained pens."
Id.
20 Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart continued in his support
for protecting the rights of the press by emphasizing its role:
Enlightened choice by an informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon
which an open society is premised, and a free press is thus indispen-
sable to a free society. Not only does the press enhance personal
self-fulfillment by providing the people with the widest possible
range of fact and opinion, but it also is an incontestable precondi-
tion of self-government.
A corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather
news. The full flow of information to the public protected by the
free press guarantee would be severely curtailed if no protection
whatever were afforded to the process by which news is assembled
and disseminated.
Id. at 726-27.
21 For a discussion of decisions holding that the press' right of access does not
exceed the general public's right of access, see infra notes 22-28 and accompany-
ing text outlining the Pell holding; infra notes 29-41 and accompanying text sum-
marizing the Saxbe decision; infra notes 42-55 and accompanying text evaluating
the Houchimns holding; infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text discussing the Gar-
rett decision.
2' 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
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prisoners.23 California passed the regulation to avoid dis-
ciplinary problems caused by inmates who become "pub-
lic figures" because of concentrated media attention.24
Citing the Branzburg proposition that the press has no
greater right of access than the general public,2 5 the Pell
Court held that the restriction did not violate the constitu-
tionally protected rights of a free press because the media
had not been denied access to information that was avail-
able to the public. 6
Justice Douglas pointed out in his Pell dissent that the
California regulation was too broad in its attempt to pro-
tect a state interest and was, therefore, an unconstitu-
tional limitation on the free press' rights.2 7 He felt that
the Court was justifying the exclusion of the press on an
unwarranted general exclusion of the public. Douglas ar-
gued that the public would be unlikely to seek admission
to the prisons but rather would rely upon information dis-
seminated by the media. Therefore, although the major-
ity upheld the regulation because of the public's
exclusion, Douglas' dissent questioned the legitimacy of
2- Id. at 819. The Court identified the relevant provision of section 415.071 of
the California Department of Corrections Manual, which stated that "[plress and
other media interviews with specific individual inmates will not be permitted." Id.
24 Id. at 831-32. Disciplinary problems were said to occur when "extensive
press attention to an inmate who espoused a practice of noncooperation with
prison regulations encouraged other inmates to follow suit, thus eroding the insti-
tutions' ability to deal effectively with the inmates generally." Id. at 832.
25 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684. The Court held that "[d]espite the fact that new-
sgathering might be hampered" the press had no constitutionally protected spe-
cial access rights that were not available to the public. Id.
26 Pell, 417 U.S. at 835. In explaining its decision that the access restrictions
upon the press were constitutional, the Court stated:
The Constitution does not, however, require government to accord
the press special access to information not shared by members of the
public generally .... [Imposing an] . . affirmative duty to make avail-
able to journalists sources of information not available to members
of the public generally.., finds no support in the words of the Con-
stitution or in any decision of this Court.
Id. at 834-35 (citations omitted).
21 Id. at 841 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The dissent stressed that an absolute
press ban prohibiting interviews with designated federal inmates was broader
than necessary to protect any legitimate governmental concerns and, therefore,
unconstitutionally infringed upon the free press guarantee, which protects the
public's right to know.
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that exclusion and recognized the need for the press to
act as a surrogate for the public in certain
circumstances.28
In the companion case of Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,2 9
the Court also upheld, on the same basis as Pell,30 a Policy
Statement of the Federal Bureau of Prisons that prohib-
ited personal interviews by reporters with designated in-
mates of medium and maximum security prisons.3
Designated interviews were limited to families, attorneys,
and religious counsel-the general public was precluded
from visiting a prisoner with whom no such relationship
existed.32 As in Pell, the press was not denied access to
any information that was available to the general public.
The Saxbe Court noted that the reporters' access to the
prisons was not totally restricted. For instance, the press
was allowed general access to the prisons for tours and
photographs, interviews by mail were virtually unlimited,
brief general conversations about prison conditions were
allowed with random inmates, prison officials were re-
quired to provide background information about prisoner
complaints, and a large volume of recently released pris-
oners provided an additional source of information to the
28 Id.
29 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (5-4 decision).
so Pell, 417 U.S. at 834. The Saxbe court ruled that the case was indistinguish-
able from and controlled by the Pell decision. Saxbe, therefore, reaffirmed the Pell
holding that the press had no constitutionally protected access rights beyond
those of the public. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850.
s, Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844 n.1. The Court quoted the pertinent policy from para-
graph 4b(6) of Policy statement 1220.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons:
Press representatives will not be permitted to interview individual
inmates. This rule shall apply even where the inmate requests or
seeks an interview. However, conversation may be permitted with
inmates whose identity is not to be made public, if it is limited to the
discussion of institutional facilities, programs and activities.
Id. 2 Id. at 846. The Court expressed its view of the restrictions as follows:
[Apparently] the sole limitation imposed on newsgathering by Policy
Statement 1220.1A is no more than a particularized application of
the general rule that nobody may enter the prison and designate an
inmate whom he would like to visit, unless the prospective visitor is a




reporters.3 3 These examples of access combined with the
state interest of avoiding substantial disciplinary problems
in the prison population convinced a majority of the
Court that the provision did not violate any First Amend-
ment guarantee. 4
Justice Powell, writing for the Saxbe dissent, downplayed
the alternative means of gaining prisoner information as
less effective and inferior to the personal interviews that
are essential to the accurate reporting of prison condi-
tions.3 5 While agreeing that newsgatherers have no con-
stitutional rights superior to members of the public,
Powell argued that nondiscriminatory restrictions on
press access did not negate the existence of a right to
gather news. Powell believed that Branzburg, read broadly
and in context, supports a constitutional guarantee to
some prepublishing activities. 36 The press, he said, must
act as the "necessary representative of the public's inter-
33 Id. at 847-48. Therefore, the Court believed that, other than the Policy State-
ment 1220. IA limit on personal press-inmate interviews, press members were af-
forded substantial opportunities to observe and report the federal prison
conditions.
14 Id. at 849-50.
3- Id. at 852-56 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell urged that a personal
interview is essential. Specifically, he stated:
Only in a face-to-face discussion can a reporter put a question to an
inmate and respond to his answer with an immediate follow-up ques-
tion. Only in an interview can the reporter pursue a particular line
of inquiry to a satisfactory resolution or confront an inmate with dis-
crepancies or apparent inconsistencies in his story. Without a per-
sonal interview a reporter is often at a loss to determine the honesty
of his informant or the accuracy of the information received.
Id. at 854.
-6 Id. at 858-59. Justice Powell expressed his view of the prior decision as
follows:
It is true, of course, that the Branzburg decision rejected an argument
grounded in the assertion of a First Amendment right to gather
news and that the opinion contains language which, when read. in
isolation, may be read to support the majority's view. Taken in its
entirety, however, Branzburg does not endorse so sweeping a rejec-
tion of First Amendment challenges to restraints on access to news
.... To the contrary, we recognized explicitly that the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of the press does extend to some of the ante-
cedent activities that make the right to publish meaningful.
Id. (citation omitted).
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est" in protecting an uninhibited flow of information from
the prison. The press represents the instrumentality
through which the public gains information about the af-
fairs of the government.3 8
Believing that the guarantee of freedom of the press
had been invaded, Justice Powell then conducted an anal-
ysis of whether the government had justified the need for
such a restrictive policy. As discussed in Pell, 39 concen-
trated media attention can result in disciplinary problems
from prisoners who become "public figures" or "big
wheels." 4 ° While acknowledging the "big wheel" phe-
nomenon and the potential for disruptive behavior, the
dissent contended that less restrictive alternatives were
available that satisfactorily mitigated the "big wheel"
problems.4
37 Id. at 864.
-1 Id. Justice Powell supported his view of the press' role as the public's repre-
sentative in newsgathering as follows:
That function is recognized by specific reference to the press in the
text of the Amendment and by the precedents of this Court: 'The
Constitution specifically selected the press ... to play an important
role in the discussion of public affairs. Thus the press serves and
was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power
by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for
keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people
whom they were selected to serve.'
Id. at 863-64 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)(striking down a
criminal statute prohibiting newspaper editors from publishing election day edito-
rials urging citizens to vote in a particular manner)).
-s Pell, 417 U.S. at 831.
40 Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 866-68. Expert testimony at the trial indicated that
whether increased media attention actually resulted in a leadership role for the
inmate depended upon the inmate's individual personality and prior reputation.
Therefore, selective attention received by certain inmates could, in some cases,
result in disciplinary problems. Id. at 867 n.10.
41 Id. at 866-68. Since disciplinary problems failed to automatically result from
media attention, the breadth of the interview ban was questioned by the dissent:
Moreover, the Bureau has not shown that it is unable to identify dis-
ruptive 'big wheels' and to take precautions specifically designed to
prevent the adverse effects of media attention to such inmates. In
short, the remedy of no interview of any inmate is broader than is
necessary to avoid the concededly real problems of the 'big wheel'
phenomenon.
Id. at 868 (footnote omitted).
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Another prison access case, Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,42
arose in 1977. As a result of an inmate suicide in a facility
where conditions were allegedly contributing to mental
health problems, KQED, a broadcasting company li-
censed to operate television and radio stations, sought ac-
cess to inspect the prison environment.43 Prison officials
originally denied access. Subsequently, after a formal
complaint was filed by a local organization, the sheriff es-
tablished monthly public tours. The sheriff, however,
banned all cameras and tape recorders, disallowed inmate
interviews during tours, and prohibited the viewing of dis-
ciplinary cells and the portion of the facility in which the
press purported that excessive violence and adverse con-
ditions existed.4 4 Prison officials justified these restric-
tions as necessary to ensure that inmate privacy was
protected and that security problems did not arise from
the creation of "jail celebrities. ' 45
KQED argued that Branzburg and Pe1 46 established a
constitutionally guaranteed newsgathering right, and
from that right, the petitioners urged the existence of "an
42 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
4-1 Id. at 4.
44 Id. at 4-5.
45 Id. at 3-5. "[The sheriff] asserted ... that unregulated access by the media
would infringe inmate privacy, and tend to create 'jail celebrities,' who in turn
tend to generate internal problems and undermine jail security. He also con-
tended that unscheduled media tours would disrupt jail operations." Id. at 5
(footnote omitted). The Court emphasized that inmates did not lose the funda-
mental right to privacy upon confinement. Inmates "are not like animals in a zoo
to be filmed and photographed at will by the public or by media reporters, how-
ever 'educational' the process may be for others." Id. at 5 n.2. The Court's recog-
nition of privacy rights for inmates is important to the dignity protections for air
crash victims that are developed later in this Comment. Dignity considerations
may represent a need to limit the degree of access allowed the press. See supra
note 199 and accompanying text.
46 For a discussion of the Branzburg decision in which the Court acknowledged
that newsgathering must be protected to prevent the obliteration of the First
Amendment's freedom of the press guarantees, see supra notes 13-20 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the Pell case in which the court reaffirmed the
constitutionally protected right to gather information, see supra notes 22-28 and
accompanying text. KQED used both of those decisions to imply that special ac-
cess rights should be permitted to investigate governmental abuses in the prisons
about which the voting public had a right to know.
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implied special right of access to government-controlled
sources of information. ' 47 In'short, KQED proposed that
public access to prisons is required to prohibit prison offi-
cials from effectively concealing substandard conditions.48
Although the Houchins Court agreed with some of the gen-
eral assertions regarding the importance ofjail conditions
and the media's role of acting in the public's behalf,49 the
Court found no precedential support for an implication of
special access rights.5 0 Rather, the Court believed that it
was the legislature's task to determine prison access poli-
cies.5 Therefore, since no constitutional right to govern-
mental information was accorded to the general public,
the Court held that the media also had no right of
access.
5 2
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, acknowledged the major-
ity's view that the press had no greater right of access than
the public, but he felt that the denial of public access to
information about prison conditions was itself unconstitu-
tional.5 3 The right to gather such information about pub-
lic facility operations, he contended, is essential to the
self-governance process intended by the Constitution's
47 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 7-8.
48 Id.
41, Id. at 8. In short, the Court said:
We can agree with many of the respondents' generalized assertions;
conditions in jails and prisons are clearly [important public] matters
.... Beyond question the role of the media is important; acting as
the 'eyes and ears' of the public, they can be a powerful and con-
structive force, contributing to remedial action in the conduct of
public business .... [Blut like all other components of our society
media representatives are subject to limits.
Id.
.0 Id. at 14.
-' Id. at 12. "Whether the government should open penal institutions in the
manner sought by respondents is a question of policy which a legislative body
might appropriately resolve one way or the other." Id.
-2 Id. at 15-16. "[U]ntil the political branches decree otherwise, as they are free
to do, the media have no special right of access to the ... j]ail different from or
greater than that accorded the public generally." Id. at 16.
" id. at 27-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Precedential authority, Justice Stevens
argued, shows that "the Court has never intimated that a nondiscriminatory policy
of excluding entirely both the public and the press from access to information
about prison conditions would avoid constitutional scrutiny." Id.
COMMENTS
framers.- Particularly, the public needs information
about the operation of prisons to monitor the publicly fi-
nanced facilities and to ensure that the accused receives
his constitutionally protected right to a fair, public trial,
which includes the punishment phase.55
One of the final cases holding to the narrow view of
press access rights was Garrett v. Estelle,5 6 a 1977 Fifth Cir-
cuit case that involved a state of Texas media policy
prohibiting the audio or video recording of executions. 7
In reversing the district court's order to allow the filming,
the circuit court relied upon Pell5 8 and Saxbe 59 for the
proposition that the press had no greater right of access
than the general public.60 The Garrett court was not per-
suaded by the argument that the event's degree of public
importance should affect the outcome of the decision.
That is, even acknowledging the importance of the event,
the court held that the right to gather news protected
under the First Amendment was not impaired by the pol-
icy because the press had access to the same information
as the public and no effort to conceal the execution pro-
cess was involved.6 '
In summary, the cases from Branzburg to Garrett held
Id. at 32. In support of an information gathering right, Justice Stevens
stressed that the safeguard "is not for the private benefit of those who might qual-
ify as representatives of the 'press' but to insure that the citizens are fully in-
formed regarding matters of public interest and importance." Id.
.1.1 Id. at 36-37. Prisons represent an integral part of a criminal justice system
that is financed with public monies and operated by civil servants such that the
public's right and need to know of its conditions is of paramount importance.
The public must have faith in the criminal justice system. Stevens believed that
"[it is important not only that the trial itself be fair, but also that the community
at large have confidence in the integrity of the proceeding." Id.
. 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978).
.I7 Id. at 1276 n. 1. The pertinent section of the Texas Department of Correc-
tions "Media Policy: Execution Proceedings" was quoted as follows: "No record-
ing devices, either audio or video, [shall] be permitted either in the execution
chamber or monitor room." Id.
5" For a discussion of the Pell decision, see supra notes 22-28 and accompanying
text.
.19 For a discussion of the Saxbe decision, see supra notes 29-41 and accompany-
ing text.
Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1279.
6, Id. at 1278-79. At this point in the case law development, the Court still
1990] 653
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firmly to the position that the press had no greater right
of access to information than the general public. The
cases did, however, establish a constitutionally protected
right to gather news. The recognition of this right fore-
shadowed the evolution of access rights that occurred in
subsequent opinions. Modern cases would, in fact, begin
to recognize additional guarantees of access to which the
press was entitled under the First Amendment.
B. Modern Cases Imply Special Access Rights
In 1980, the Supreme Court delivered the landmark de-
cision of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.62 For the
first time, the Court recognized that the public's right to
attend criminal trials was guaranteed under the First
Amendment.63 The Court reversed the Virginia Supreme
Court's holding and struck down a statute that allowed
closure of a criminal trial at the presiding judge's discre-
tion.64 After a review of the historical origins of and a so-
cietal need for open criminal proceedings,65 the Court
focused upon a comparison between the press' and the public's right of access.
Highlighting that equality, the Court opined:
While we agree that the death penalty is a matter of wide public in-
terest, we disagree that the protections of the [F]irst [A]mendment
depend upon the notoriety of an issue. The Supreme Court has held
that the [F]irst [A]mendment does not protect means of gathering
news in prisons not available to the public generally, and this hold-
ing is not predicated upon the importance or degree of interest in
the matter reported.
Id. at 1279.
62 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion). For a detailed discussion of the case,
see Note, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia: A New But Uncertain "Right of Access",
32 SYRACUSE L. REV. 989 (1981).
, Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581.
Id. at 560. The statute provided in pertinent part:
In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or mis-
demeanor cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the
trial any persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair
trial, provided that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not
be violated.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266 (1980).
wl Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-73. The Court's recognition of the psy-
chological as well as procedural function of trials is shown in the following
statement:
When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and
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recognized that a freedom to listen must necessarily ac-
company the right to free speech and press.6 6 In other
words, the right to publicize what occurs at a trial would
have little meaning if public observance of the proceed-
ings were arbitrarily foreclosed.6 7 Further, the Court
noted that the trial judge had made no findings to support
the closure order, no search for possible alternative solu-
tions to ensure fairness, and no recognition of the consti-
tutional right of the public to attend trials.6 Absent a
showing of these factors, the Court held that the criminal
trial must be open to the public.
The Richmond Newspapers Court was far from unified in
its opinion as to how the case should be analyzed. Seven
separate opinions were voiced by the justices. Of particu-
lar note, Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, stated that
"for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an
arbitrary interference with access to important informa-
tion is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of
public protest often follows. Thereafter the open processes of jus-
tice ...provid[e] an outlet for community concern, hostility, and
emotion. Without an awareness that society's responses to criminal
conduct are underway, natural human reactions of outrage and pro-
test are frustrated and may manifest themselves in some form of
vengeful 'self-help.'
Id. at 571 (citations omitted).
Id. at 576. "In a variety of contexts [the] Court has referred to a First
Amendment right to 'receive information and ideas.'" Id. (quoting Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (holding that executive decisions to exclude an
alien from entering the country would not be weighed against the First Amend-
ment interests of those wishing to personally communicate with the alien)).
67 id. at 576-77. The Court has increasingly regarded the press as the public's
representative in modern society.
That the right to attend may be exercised by people less frequently
today when information as to trials generally reaches them by way of
print and electronic media in no way alters the basic right. Instead
of relying on personal observation or reports from neighbors as in
the past, most people receive information concerning trials through
the media whose representatives 'are entitled to the same rights [to
attend trials] as the general public.'
Id. at 577 n.12 (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) (holding that
televising a criminal trial over the defendant's objections represents an infringe-
ment upon the fundamental right to a fair trial)).
" Id. at 580-81.
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the press protected by the First Amendment."6 9
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan proposed the
following two-step analysis: (1) conduct a review of the
historical and current practices to determine if any special
force of tradition warrants a right of access to proceed-
ings, and (2) balance the value of protecting a right of en-
trance to the proceedings under the First Amendment
against the importance of that particular process or gov-
ernmental interest. 70
Justice Brennan found the closure before the Court in-
appropriate because trials have historically been open and
the publicity surrounding a trial serves to advance the
fairness of the proceedings. 7 ' Arguing that the publicity
arising from access to proceedings functions to avoid
prejudice and arbitrariness and aids in accurate fact-find-
ing, Brennan found that the governmental interest in al-
lowing closure at the judge's discretion did not outweigh
the purposes advanced by access.72 Brennan concluded
by noting that the statute allowed the trial judge to exer-
cise "unfettered discretion" without the justification of
countervailing interests that would overcome a presump-
tion of openness."
Justice Stewart, in his concurring discussion of open-
ness in the trial process, also recognized the qualified na-
ture of the right of attendance at trials. Citing Houchins,
6 Id. at 583 (Stevens,J., concurring). Justice Stevens stated in his concurrence:
[T]he First Amendment protects the public and the press from
abridgment of their rights of access to information about the opera-
tion of their government, including the Judicial Branch; given the
total absence of any record justification for the closure order en-
tered in this case, that order violated the First Amendment.
Id. at 584.
70 Id. at 589. The second balancing step is the standard that subsequent courts
would adopt in analyzing access cases.
71 Id. at 598.
72 Id. at 593, 595-96.
7- Id. at 597-98. Brennan stated: "Popular attendance at trials, in sum, sub-
stantially furthers the particular public purposes of [those] critical judicial pro-
ceeding[s]. In that sense, public access is an indispensable element of the trial
process itself. Trial access, therefore, assumes structural importance in 'our gov-
ernment of laws'...." Id. at 597 (footnote and citation omitted).
[56
he stressed that even though physical limitations may re-
quire quotas on attendance, "[i]n such situations, repre-
sentatives of the press must be assured access. ' ' T In
short, Stewart believed that the trial judge's failure to con-
sider either the press' or the public's right to attend the
criminal trial necessitated reversal.
Following Richmond Newspapers, courts began to ac-
knowledge a broader right of access to gather information
by extending the right beyond the criminal trial setting.
Cable News Network, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos. 75 in-
volved the exclusion of broadcast media from certain
White House events after the networks could not agree
among themselves which of them would represent the
others at restricted capacity events. 76 After a brief sum-
mary of the right of access cases, the federal district court
granted a temporary restraining order to prevent imple-
mentation of the media exclusion policy.77 The court
held that the right of access to information was constitu-
tionally protected; the press acted as the public's agent in
such newsgathering; and, the right was qualified, not ab-
solute.78 The court suggested that acceptable bases for
restricting access could range from physical space limita-
tions to security considerations.79
74 Id. at 600 n.3. In assessing the qualified nature of the First Amendment right
of access, Justice Stewart recognized that "UWust as a legislature may impose rea-
sonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon the exercise of First Amend-
ment freedoms, so may a trial judge impose reasonable limitations upon the
unrestricted occupation of a courtroom by representatives of the press and mem-
bers of the public." Id. at 600. For a discussion of the Houchins case, see supra
notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
7- 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
76 Id. at 1239-40.
77 Id. at 1240.
78 id. at 1244.
79 Id. The newsgathering right acknowledged in the decision was a qualified
right subject to reasonable limitations. In recognizing the right, the court said:
[Tihe rights guaranteed and protected by the First Amendment in-
clude a right of access to news or information concerning the opera-
tions and activities of government. This right is held by both the
general public and the press, with the press acting as a representa-
tive or agent of the public as well as on its own behalf. Without such
a right, the goals and purposes of the First Amendment would be
meaningless. However, such a right of access is qualified, rather
1990] COMMENTS 657
658 JOURNAL OF AIR L,4 WAND COMMERCE [56
After recognizing the existence of a protected new-
sgathering right, the Cable News Network court analyzed the
restrictions upon that right by utilizing the Richmond News-
papers balancing test.8 0 The court compared the interest
served by the newsgathering activity with the govern-
ment's interest protected by the restriction. Since the
print media was represented at the White House events in
question, information was able to flow to the public. The
fact that many citizens predominantly rely upon television
for information, however, weighed heavily in favor of the
public's significant interest in protecting the broadcast
networks' access to the White House."' The White House
Press Office offered no compelling reason to exclude the
television networks but only desired to avoid selecting any
particular network over another.8 2 In short, the govern-
ment did not justify the burdensome restriction that re-
duced the public's access to constitutionally protected
information. 3
than absolute, and is subject to limiting considerations such as confi-
dentiality, security, orderly process, spatial limitation, and doubtless
many others.
Id.
8o Id. at 1244-45. For a discussion of the Richmond Newspapers balancing test, see
supra note 70 and accompanying text.
s, Cable News Network, 518 F. Supp. at 1245. In addition to the public's in-
creased reliance upon television, the court noted that video coverage provides a
visual impact, comprehensiveness, and immediacy not available in print media.
Also, as the importance of the event increases, such as presidential activities, the
court stated that the importance of providing the public the fullest information
possible also increases. The conclusion, therefore, was that the public had a sig-
nificant interest in continued press coverage at White House events. Id. But cf.
Combined Communications Corp. v. Finesilver, 672 F.2d 818, 821 (10th Cir.
1982) (stating that the position of Cable News Network has been rejected in the
context of the courthouse, where the electronic media can be constitutionally ex-
cluded on due process grounds).
'2 Cable News Network, 518 F. Supp. at 1245. Since the court previously decided
that a limited right of access existed, the Press Office's reliance upon the legal
premise that no right existed, failed to justify exclusion of the press from White
House events. Id.
8- Id. at 1245. The government failed to establish any overriding interest that
would outweigh the protected right of access. The court stated:
[T]he Press Office [has not] advanced any reason such as considera-
tions of security or space limitation for refusing television cover-
age .... Having applied the proper balancing test, the Court finds
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In 1982, the Supreme Court again looked into the right
of access to trial proceedings. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Supe-
rior Court 84 involved a challenge to a statute that allowed
automatic trial closure for sexual offense cases involving
minor victims. 85 Citing Richmond Newspapers, 6 the Court
discussed the right of access to criminal trials in terms of
its historical perspective and its structural role in the judi-
cial process.8 7 The Court specified that the right was
qualified, not absolute. Again, using the Richmond Newspa-
pers balancing test, the Court held that validation of the
statute required the state to establish a compelling inter-
est that demanded mandatory closure.88
Although the Globe Newspaper Court agreed that the
state had a strong interest in protecting victims from addi-
tional trauma and in encouraging similar victims to come
forward, the Court did not believe that mandatory closure
would ensure either goal.8 9 The press was not barred
from publishing information from transcripts. Further-
more, the Court indicated that not every victim or case
that the total exclusion of television representatives from White
House pool coverage denies the public and the press their limited
right of access, guaranteed by the First Amendment ...
Id.
" 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
85 Id. at 598 n. 1. The following represents the pertinent part of the law:
At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal
abuse or other crime involving sex, where a minor under eighteen
years of age is the person upon, with or against whom the crime is
alleged to have been committed .... the presiding justice shall ex-
clude the general public from the court room, admitting only such
persons as may have a direct interest in the case.
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 278, § 16A (1981).
86 For a discussion of the Richmond Newspapers case, see supra notes 62-74 and
accompanying text.
87 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605-06. Specifically, the Court viewed access as
an integral part of the judicial process. That is, "[plublic scrutiny of a criminal
trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the fact finding process.
... Moreover, public access to the criminal trial fosters an appearance of fairness,
thereby heightening public respect for the judicial process." Id. at 606.
88 Id. at 605-07. The Court held that for a state to deny access rights to prevent
the disclosure of sensitive information, the state must establish that the exclusion
is the result of a "compelling governmental interest" and tailor the restriction
narrowly to protect that interest.
89 Id. at 607.
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warranted automatic, total exclusion. The closure rule,
therefore, was held too restrictive and violative of First
Amendment guarantees. 90
ChiefJustice Burger, in a strongly worded dissent, indi-
cated that the Court should confine its review to whether
the restrictions were reasonable and whether the state's
interest exceeded the incidental effects to First Amend-
ment rights.91 In Burger's view, the interests of the state
in protecting child victims were clearly more compelling
than a right of access because the information was avail-
able through other sources, such as transcripts.9 2
The Court has also recognized a right of access in other
instances. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court 93 involved a
writ of mandate compelling the release of a voir dire tran-
script and vacating an order closing the voir dire proceed-
ings of a rape and murder trial.94 The Court again
reviewed the essential role that the public has historically
played in the trial process and reiterated its position that a
presumption of openness can only be overcome by show-
ing a substantial state interest. 95 Since the trial judge
- Id. at 607-11. The court, however, repeated that the holding was considered
only in the narrow mandatory closure context.
In individual cases, and under appropriate circumstances, the First
Amendment does not necessarily stand as a bar to the exclusion
from the courtroom of the press and general public during the testi-
mony of minor sex-offense victims. But a mandatory rule, requiring
no particularized determinations in individual cases, is
unconstitutional.
Id. at 611 n.27.
91 Id. at 616 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
92 Id. ChiefJustice Burger stated:
Neither the purpose of the law nor its effect is primarily to deny the
press or public access to information; the verbatim transcript is
made available to the public and the media and may be used without
limit. We therefore need only examine whether the restrictions im-
posed are reasonable and whether the interests of the Common-
wealth override the very limited incidental effects of the law on First
Amendment rights.
Id.
93 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
94 Id. at 505-06.
95 Id. at 504. "Closed proceedings, although not absolutely precluded, must be
rare and only for cause shown that outweighs the value of openness." Id. at 509.
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failed to consider alternatives that would avoid sealing the
transcripts and closing the proceedings, the Court held
that the presumption of openness had not been over-
come.96 Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion, fur-
ther stressed that closure or sealing should only be
granted if it would be the least restrictive mode of protec-
tion available.97
In Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen,98 the Third Circuit
expanded the right of access to civil proceedings. 99 The
trial court closed proceedings related to a proxy fight in-
volving a publicly traded corporation. Several news orga-
nizations unsuccessfully sought to have the proceedings
opened. 00 By analyzing the cases confirming a right of
access to criminal proceedings, the court came to the con-
clusion that the same First Amendment rights were avail-
able in civil proceedings.' 0' Again, the court viewed the
right of access as a presumption subject to rebuttal by
showing both an overriding governmental interest and a
Id. at 513. In analyzing the lower court's holding, the Court specified:
[Tihe trial judge provided no explanation as to why his broad order
denying access to information at the voir dire was not limited to in-
formation that was actually sensitive and deserving of privacy pro-
tection. Nor did he consider whether he could disclose the
substance of the sensitive answers while preserving the anonymity of
the jurors involved.
Id.
97 Id. at 520-22. Justice Marshall's concurrence expressed the view that "prior
to issuing a closure order, a trial court should be obliged to show that the order in
question constitutes the least restrictive means available for protecting compelling
state interests." Id. at 521 (emphasis in original).
98 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984). For other circuit court cases holding that a
right of access to civil proceedings exists, see Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad-
casting System, 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985);
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
- Publicker Industries, 733 F.2d at 1071.
too Id. at 1063.
to, Id. at 1067-71. The court summarized its analysis as follows:
From the foregoing discussion it becomes clear that the public and
the press possess a First Amendment and a common law right of
access to civil proceedings; indeed, there is a presumption that these
proceedings will be open. The trial court may limit this right, how-
ever, when an important countervailing interest is shown.
Id. at 1071.
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lack of viable alternatives. 0 2 The district court's closure
without an articulation of countervailing interests or the
exploration of alternatives was ruled an abuse of
discretion.
A New York District Court also addressed the press'
First Amendment right of access. In WPIX, Inc. v. League
of Women Voters,'0° an independent producer sought a pre-
liminary injunction to prohibit the use of a mandatory
press pool for coverage of a presidential debate.'0 4 The
financial barriers of buying into the pool effectively re-
duced the opportunity for independent producers to pro-
vide first-hand coverage.10 5
After addressing whether the "state action" require-
ment was sufficiently satisfied, the court turned to the
press' right of access. 10 6 Although the court ultimately
denied the injunction because WPIX did not show that
the preliminary relief was necessary, workable, or fair, the
court did recognize a potential injury stemming from a
permanent violation of the independent producers' First
Amendment right to provide additional and unique cover-
age. 0 7 That is, the court affirmed that the press had a
limited right of access to events in their capacity as agents
for the public as well as on their own behalf as press mem-
bers. Further, the court held that the only acceptable lim-
its on that right were reasonable restrictions as to time,
place, and manner of coverage that did not unnecessarily
curtail guaranteed freedoms. 10 8
102 Id. at 1070.
,o3 595 F. Supp. 1484 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
1- Id. at 1485.
,os Id. at 1486.
,o Id. at 1487-89. The court used the public nature of the debates, the substan-
tial public campaign funds involved, and the institutionalization of the League of
Women Voters' role in organized debates to establish sufficient state action to
enable the review of the First Amendment access issue. Id.
107 Id. at 1493.
'°8 Id. at 1489-90. The court discussed the press' right of the access in the fol-
lowing statement: "Under the [F]irst [A]mendment, press organizations have a
limited right of access to newsworthy events in their capacity as representatives of
the public and on their own behalf as members of the press .... Id. at 1489. The
court continued its analysis of the qualified nature of the access right as follows:
[56
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The League presented no overriding governmental in-
terest that would compel the restriction of a right of ac-
cess guarantee. 0 9 None of the evidence indicated that
space limitations necessitated preclusion of additional
camera crews." 0 Additionally, the mere availability of the
network's coverage may not have sufficiently provided an
opportunity for WPIX's own unique style of coverage."'
The reasons for exclusion, therefore, failed to outweigh
the value of the protected access rights, particularly when
alternative solutions were available.
Another step in the general development of the press'
right of access occurred in Society of Professional Journalists v.
Secretary of Labor, ' 2 which recognized a right of access to
While the Supreme Court has held that access by the press or public
to public places such as streets and courts can be [reasonably] re-
strict[ed], 'the question in a particular case is whether that control is
exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge ... the opportu-
nities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public
questions immemorially associated with resort to public places.'
Id. at 1490 (citations omitted) (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574
(1941) (holding that the right of assembly was not unnecessarily infringed upon
by a state statute prohibiting processions without a license)).
t,, WPIX, 595 F. Supp. at 1489-90.
,to Id. at 1490-91. Insufficient governmental interests as well as the availability
of alternatives prevented the court from deciding that the balance was in favor of
the League. Specifically, the court summarized its evaluation of the government's
interests as follows:
No reason has been advanced at this point as to why it was necessary
or appropriate for the major networks to take turns broadcasting the
debates, when several broadcasters could have operated simultane-
ously; and no reason has been suggested as to why the League and
networks did not devise a pool in which all the reasonably available
camera space could be utilized.
Id. at 1490.
11 id. at 1491. WPIX contended that its style was unique because previous net-
work coverage was more conservative and less candid than the viewpoint that
WPIX would provide with camera techniques not used by the networks. Specifi-
cally, the intensity of the debate, revealed through split screens, candid reaction
shots and close-ups, and a focus upon the dynamism of the event would create a
visual perspective designed to convey the actual point of view of the participants.
WPIX asserted that the networks' more conservative methods and coverage would
affect the editorial product provided to the public. Therefore, by restricting ac-
cess, WPIX argued that the public would not receive all of the information and
visual perspectives to which it was entitled. Id.
112 616 F. Supp. 569 (D. Utah 1985).
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administrative proceedings."' After a mining accident,
the Secretary of Labor closed the investigatory hearings
exploring the cause of the accident. Although no statu-
tory requirement to conduct open hearings existed, the
court reviewed whether a right of access was required
under the First Amendment." 14
The Society of Professional Journalists court extended the
public's First Amendment right of access from the already
established criminal and civil processes to administrative
fact-finding hearings. ' ' Initially, the court stated that dif-
ficulties arise upon acknowledging that the press has a
right of access even when the public is excluded. The dif-
ficulties discussed included determining whether a person
is a member of the press, "6 preventing a decrease in the
benefits of a right of access when it is limited to the
press, 17 and establishing guidelines that comply with pre-
vious Supreme Court rulings that refused a right of access
1 Id. at 578-79.
114 Id. at 572. Statutory provisions empower the Secretary to hold public hear-
ings but do not require him to do so. 30 U.S.C. § 813(b)(1982).
115 Society of ProfessionalJournalists, 616 F. Supp. at 573-74. The court noted that,
although legislatures have traditionally more actively promoted open access, the
courts have also found rights of access, particularly in the area of criminal trials.
Id.
I"6 Id. at 573. When a special right of access is granted, distinguishing between
the press and the public becomes a problem.
The difficulty of identifying members of the press has been made
more difficult by the expansion of methods of reporting the news.
The term 'press' can refer to the traditional media such as newspa-
per, magazine, television, and radio news reporters, as well as the
non-traditional press such as writers of non-fiction books or articles
and the creators of documentary films.
Id. at 573 n.3.
117 Id. at 573. The Court viewed admitting the press preferentially as a poten-
tial problem.
If members of the general public cannot attend a hearing, then the
only information they can receive will have been filtered through the
press. Although one might expect that the press would report fully
on all matters of public interest, that is frequently not the case ....
A press right of access is often an inadequate substitute for a right of
access for all interested members of the public. Allowing the press
to decide what the public will hear is subject to the same abuse, and
perhaps to a greater degree, as the government itself deciding what
the public and press will hear.
Id. (citations omitted).
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based solely upon the freedom of the press guarantee." 8
The court reviewed the Supreme Court cases allowing
access to various phases of criminal proceedings and rec-
ognized that several circuit courts had also extended ac-
cess rights to civil trials." 9 Additionally, the court
discussed the Cable News Network decision granting a right
of access to presidential debates. 20 Although the federal
district court stated that the Cable News Network holding
was too broad in its protection of access to a range of gov-
ernmental activities,12 ' the court approved of the Rich-
mond Newspapers analysis, 22  as adopted in the Globe
Newspaper decision.' 2  Therefore, the Society of Professional
Journalists court extended access to nonjudicial
proceedings. 2 4
The court reviewed the historical significance of the in-
vestigative hearing as well as the "procedural importance
of openness" to determine whether access to administra-
tive hearings was warranted.12 5 The court found that ad-
"1 Id. The court stated that the Supreme Court rulings in Pell and Houchins
precluded basing a right of access solely upon the First Amendment. Id. For a
discussion of the Pell decision, see supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of Houchins, see supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
III) Society of Professional Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 574. For a discussion of cir-
cuit court cases involving access to civil proceedings, see supra note 98.
120 See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
121 Society of ProfessionalJournalists, 616 F. Supp. at 574-75. The acknowledgment
of the extension beyond judicial proceedings to an administrative setting was criti-
cal to the overall development of the press' right of access. The court expressed
reservations as to the broadness of the right and expected subsequent limitations.
That is, the court stated that the "rather broad statement that the right applies to
'news or information concerning the operations and activities of government' will
undoubtedly be limited in subsequent cases." Id. at 575 (quoting Cable News
Network, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 (N.D. Ga.
1981)).
122 For a discussion of the Richmond Newspapers case, see supra notes 62-74 and
accompanying text.
123 For a discussion of the Globe Newspaper decision, see supra notes 84-92 and
accompanying text.
124 Society of Professional Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 574.
125 Id. at 575-76. The court justified its extension of access rights in a statement
that "[e]ven though it is unclear whether a majority of the Supreme Court would
find such a right in this case ... this court must merely try to follow the analysis
adopted by the Supreme Court in similar cases and examine the same policy con-
siderations the Supreme Court would examine." Id. at 575.
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ministrative fact-finding hearings were akin to legislative
proceedings and civil trials such that openness was a criti-
cal element of the disaster investigation. 26 The court rea-
soned that the hearings not only provided an emotional
outlet to the public but also ensured that the proceedings
were conducted so as to avoid future disasters. 2 7
The court then evaluated viable alternatives and the
government's interest in closing the investigative hear-
ings. ' 28 Although transcripts were suggested as an alter-
native, the court found that transcripts were inadequate
because of untimely information, a filtered end product, a
potential loss of data, and the inability to duplicate in
print the emotional impact of live hearings.' 29 The court
then reviewed the government's interest in closure to de-
termine if it limited or completely outweighed the recog-
nized right of access. 30 According to the court, a limit on
attendance might be justifiable, but the mere possibility of
unfounded rumors, which was the explanation offered by
the Secretary, insufficiently established a reason for clo-
12 Id
127 Id. at 575-76. Specifically, the court theorized:
Openness is crucially important to the type of hearings . . . con-
ducted.... An investigation into the causes of the disaster can create
an emotional catharsis that soothes the community sorrow. If some-
one is responsible, people become aware of that. If no one is at
fault, people can become reassured of that. Access to the proceed-
ings, where feasible, ensures that people realize that justice is being
done.
Moreover, openness ensures that [the agency] properly does its
job.
Id. at 576. As discussed below in section V, this emotional outlet function of ac-
cess may also be important in formulating guidelines that ensure press access to
air crash sites. The severe shock combined with the usual magnitude of the disas-
ter necessitates some means of allowing the victims' relatives and friends to ac-
knowledge the occurrence of the crash, verify that the cause of the accident will be
determined, and ultimately deal with the shock of the event. Because the general
public closely identifies with the passenger victims and their families, an emo-
tional outlet may also be important for the public.
Id. at 577-78.
,211 Id. "Much of what makes good news is lost in the difference between a one-
dimensional transcript and an opportunity to see and hear testimony as it un-
folds." Id. at 578.
,.,, id. at 578-79.
sure.' 3 1 In summary, the Society of Professional Journalists
court held that both the press and public had a constitu-
tional right of access to the hearings. The government
had not established a compelling interest, such as confi-
dentiality or security, that outweighed the access right,
and no reasonable alternative means of securing the infor-
mation was available. 132The cases reviewed above show the direction in which
the courts have been moving over a fifteen year period in
terms of the press' access rights. Initially, there was no
recognized right to gather news or information. Cur-
rently, however, courts generally acknowledge the new-
sgathering right as a First Amendment guarantee. The
press' right of access was originally equated to the rights
of the general public.13 3 This narrow view, however, has
experienced continuous inroads. 3 4  Several of the con-
curring and dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court as
well as lower court holdings suggest a recognition that the
press may, in some circumstances, have a greater right of
access than the general public. 3 5
Courts have also refined the method of analysis to a bal-
ancing test that includes an evaluation of the alternative
sources of information. That is, while considering the
availability of the news from comparable methods, the test
is whether the governmental interest outweighs the value
-1 Id. at 579. "Administrative difficulties such as those advanced by the Secre-
tary are a small price to pay to entrench the procedural safeguards that keep our
society from creeping even slightly closer to totalitarianism. Such difficulties pale
in the light of the constitutional rights of free speech and a free press." Id.
152 Id.
1" For a discussion of the Branzburg view, see supra notes 13-20 and accompany-
ing text.
1.4 For a discussion of the underlying development of access rights, see supra
notes 62-74 and accompanying text regarding the Richmond Newspapers decision on
criminal proceedings; supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text regarding the
Publicker Industries case on access to civil proceedings; supra notes 112-132 and ac-
companying text regarding the Society of Professional Journalists holding on access to
administrative proceedings.
,S.- See Note, supra note 11, at 1313. "[Bloth the language and logic of Richmond
indicate that the Court may be willing to take the next step and hold that in cer-
tain circumstances the press is constitutionally entitled to a greater degree of ac-
cess than is the general public." Id.
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of the right of access necessary to secure the informa-
tion. 3 6 In judicial-type proceedings, the analysis also in-
cludes a review of the historical tradition and the
procedural importance of openness.137
The role of a free press within the structure of our gov-
ernmental system was initially discussed to provide a
framework by which to review the development of the
press' right of access and to aid in assessing what the right
should be in terms of aviation accidents. Before identify-
ing the broad concepts applicable to analyzing a special
right of access by the press to aviation crash sites, how-
ever, a review of several cases that have applied some or
all of these principles to accidents or disasters is
presented.
III. DISASTER AND ACCIDENT ACCESS CASES
A. Pre-Richmond Newspapers Decisions
In State v. Lashinsky, t s8 the Supreme Court of NewJersey
upheld the disorderly conduct conviction of a press pho-
tographer who was arrested for his failure to obey a police
officer's order to move back from the scene of an automo-
bile accident.' 39 The court recognized that the press may
be entitled to special access beyond that accorded to the
general public. Specifically, the court suggested that the
public's need to be optimally informed may warrant ac-
cess by the press when it would be reasonable to exclude
the general public. 4 ° The court emphasized, however,
that the press' right of access could be limited by reason-
1-6 For a discussion of the Richmond Newspapers' balancing test, see supra notes
62-74 and accompanying text.
1'7 For a discussion of the function of access to proceedings, see supra notes 65,
73, 86, and 127 and accompanying text.
138 81 N.J. 1, 404 A.2d 1121 (1979).
-9 Id. at 1, 404 A.2d at 1131.
,40 Id. at 1, 404 A.2d at 1128. "[Tlhe First Amendment's concern that the pub-
lic be optimally informed could in some instances render unreasonable restraints
upon the scope of access to members of the press even where it would not be
unreasonable to exclude the general public." Id.
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able restrictions formulated to protect important govern-
mental interests.
Even though Richmond Newspapers had not yet been de-
cided, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a balanc-
ing of the competing public and governmental interests to
assess the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed at
the accident scene. The conviction was upheld because
the officer's request to leave the immediate vicinity of the
accident was reasonable. Factors considered sufficient to
override the press' special right of access included a fear
of fire, preservation of the scene for investigative pur-
poses, and protection of the victim's personal effects t4 '
A dissenting justice, however, viewed the exclusion as
unreasonable. 42  The dissenting judge stated that the
purpose of a reporter or photographer at the scene of a
crime or accident is to gather information for dissemina-
tion to the public, not for his personal edification. 4 This
freedom to gather information is a constitutionally pro-
tected special right to acquire and publish the news. The
State Police had issued a press card to the defendant iden-
tifying him as one who could proceed beyond the point
normally allowed by the public, unless precluded by some
overriding concern. 4 4 Therefore, since the only interfer-
14 Id. "[A] balancing of competing values is required in order to assess the
reasonableness of a criminal statute or governmental sanction as applied to a
member of the press engaged in his profession." Id.
1 Id. at 1, 404 A.2d at 1131 (Pashman, J., dissenting). The dissent specified
that "[he] part[ed] company with the majority ... in its application of this 'reason-
ableness' test to the facts of this particular case .... As such, the 'special access
rights' of the press to which the majority pays lip service are rendered meaning-
less." Id.
14. Id. at 1, 404 A.2d at 1133. Justice Pashman viewed the free press clause of
the First Amendment as designed to protect a newsgathering right:
When on assignment, ajournalist does not visit the scene of a crime
or an accident simply for his own edification. He is there to gather
information to be passed along to the public at large. It is precisely
for this reason that the framers of the First Amendment accorded
news media representatives a special right both to acquire and dis-
seminate the news.
Id.
,14 Id. at 1, 404 A.2d at 1134. Testimony of the Chief of the State Police Infor-
mation Bureau indicated:
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ing conduct in which the defendant had engaged was
photographing the scene, the dissenting judge stated that
the officer's request to leave the scene was unreasonable
in light of the press' special role in newsgathering. 45
Subsequent cases began using the analysis standards fore-
shadowed in Lashinsky and formalized in Richmond
Newspapers.146
B. Case Law Using a Richmond Newspapers Analysis
In Westinghouse Broadcasting v. National Transportation
Safety Board, '4 7 a federal district court held that a National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) order limiting press
access a crash site without establishing an overriding rea-
son for the restriction violated the broadcasters' First
Amendment newsgathering rights.148  An airplane had
crashed on public property, and contrary to initial reports
that no lives had been lost, two passengers were missing
and presumed dead. 4 9 Because of the loss of life as well
as the delay in learning of the gravity of the accident, the
crash received increased media attention. After a large
[The] press card identifies its possessor as a responsible individual
engaged in a task deeply affected with the public interest, and thus
,as an individual who in the discretion of [a) police officer can pro-
ceed beyond that point where the public goes if it fits in with what is
going on at the time.'
ld.
,45 Id. at 1, 404 A.2d at 1134-35. Justice Pashman described the expulsion from
the scene as unreasonable for the following reason:
The press card carried by defendant and shown to [the officer] iden-
tified [the] defendant as a responsible individual engaged in the im-
portant task of bringing a newsworthy event to the attention of the
public at large. [The officer] therefore acted unreasonably in assum-
ing that this responsible individual-as opposed to the non-media
bystanders-might tamper with evidence lying about or abscond
with the victims' personal property. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, he should rather have presumed that defendant would at-
tend only to his job of photographing the scene.
Id. at 1,404 A.2d at 1135.
14,; For a discussion of the Richmond Newspapers balancing test, see supra notes
62-74 and accompanying text.
'4 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1177 (D. Mass. 1982).
148 Id. at 1179.
14) Id.
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number of media personnel arrived on the scene, the
NTSB restricted access to one camera crew and one re-
porter for one hour daily.' 50 The crew restriction was
subsequently removed, but the order retained the time
limit.15
The protection of investigative evidence was the liri-
mary governmental interest asserted by the NTSB. Testi-
mony indicated that nonmedia persons entered the crash
site and removed "souvenirs." Media personnel, how-
ever, had apparently not interfered with any items at the
scene.' -2  Since the NTSB's only interest in the wreck
through the point of the removal of the plane and its deb-
ris was in assuring that no tampering with the evidence
occurred, the NTSB's role in controlling access was lim-
ited to monitoring the site. The primary responsibility for
the scene rested with the airport.' 53
The NTSB also argued that the press had no greater
right of access than the general public. The court re-
viewed the cases from Branzburg154 to Richmond Newspa-
50 Id. To prevent interference with the investigation, the board member and
investigator in charge issued restrictions to limit the number of media personnel
at the scene. Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 1179-80. Testimony revealed the following:
[Plersons not connected with the media, persons who presumably
were employees of ... air-lines or office workers ... were taken out
to the scene, and . . walk[ed] away with parts of the wreckage or
possibly things that might be called, in a sort of gruesome sense,
souvenirs of the tragedy. ... but there is certainly no indication at all
in the evidence that any news personnel were the persons who
walked off with souvenirs or who otherwise tampered in any way
with the remnants of the crash.
Id. at 1179.
15., Id. at 1180. The judge summarized the parties' roles as follows:
The only interest of the Safety Board in this wreck today and until it
is removed, which is expected to be some days from now, is in assur-
ing that there is no tampering with it, that its position is in no way
changed, that everything is left just as it is. The Safety Board, thus,
with respect to the scene itself, has only an indirect and supervisory
or monitoring type interest. The responsibility is principally that of
[the airport].
Id.
'I For a discussion of the Branzburg case, see supra notes 13-20 and accompany-
ing text.
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pers15 5  and Cable News Network156 in reaching the
conclusion that, upon balancing the interests of the gov-
ernment and the press and reviewing alternative sources
of information, the press, as an agent of the public, may
be allowed special access to places to gather news. 157
Even the NTSB's investigative manuals acknowledged
that a crash is a newsworthy event to which the disclosure
of information would be advantageous in the prevention
of "premature speculation" and avoidance of injecting
controversy. Further, the manual mandated media permit-
ted access, unless concerns such as order, security, or spa-
tial limits required closure of the scene. 58
In sum, the Westinghouse Broadcasting court held that the
time restrictions were contrary to the press rights that had
developed over a decade. The media should have been
allowed to photograph the scene and to secure news
about the aircraft salvaging operations and the search for
15. For a discussion of the Richmond Newspapers decision, see supra notes 62-74
and accompanying text.
11 For a review of the Cable News Network case, see supra notes 75-83 and accom-
panying text.
' Westinghouse Broadcasting, 8 Media L. Rep. at 1181-83. "[T]he law has ad-
vanced since . . . Branzburg .... " Id. at 1182. By that statement, the judge re-
ferred to his analysis of Richmond Newspapers and Cable News Network in which he
determined that, although Branzburg had not been directly overruled, the cited
decisions indicated that both the press and the public have a qualified right of
access to information concerning governmental activities. Id.
Id. at 1184. The court quoted the following passage from the NTSB's inves-
tigative manual dated April 25, 1980 from a section on page 10-10 entitled "Coor-
dination with Office of Public Affairs":
News reporters and photographers have a function and responsibil-
ity to carry out in the reporting of news, and an aircraft accident is a
newsworthy event. The investigator in charge must reconcile coop-
eration with the press with NTSB policies on the disclosure of infor-
mation. The NTSB gives out factual information which is accurate
and substantiated. To do otherwise would possibly lend weight to
premature speculation in the news and inject controversy into the
investigation outside the realm of objective fact-finding.
Id.
NTSB regulations indicate that the release of information regarding the field
investigation must be limited to factual developments and released only by a
board member. 49 C.F.R. § 831.13 (1989). The manual provisions quoted above,
however, emphasize that the release of factual information serves an important
purpose in maintaining control and preventing controversial speculations.
missing persons.15 9 The court held that no reasonable ba-
sis for the order existed because the press could obtain
the information without touching the wreckage, the plane
was in the open, and the runway was not in use.' 60 Also,
the press had no alternative means of acquiring the infor-
mation. The order, therefore, was ruled an unconstitu-
tional limitation on the press' right of access.' 6' The
Court instructed the airport to issue any future limits in
writing, including justifications for all limitations.162
In City of Oak Creek v. King,16 3 a recent airplane crash
case, the court upheld a reporter's conviction for disor-
derly conduct. 164 After an air crash, the local sheriff's de-
partment secured the site to allow only emergency
personnel and equipment onto the scene.165 Significantly,
only one route of direct access was available to emergency
vehicles. An unauthorized television crew proceeded
through the roadblock, and an officer instructed the crew
to leave the area. Although three of the crew eventually
complied with the officer's instructions, the fourth refused
to cooperate, jumped a fence, and ran to the top of a hill.
Upon his repeated refusal to leave, officials arrested the
reporter. Less than thirty minutes after the unauthorized
entry, the airport director held a news briefing and es-
corted media representatives to the site as required by the
15 Westinghouse Broadcasting, 8 Media L. Rep. at 1184.
- Id. More specifically, the judge said:
In this instance, where the runway is not in use, where there is a
fusilage [sic] of an airplane out in the open, where cameramen and
news reporters can fulfill their functions without touching the wreck-
age or stepping upon it or moving upon it, where the board's inves-
tigation with respect to an inspection of the wreckage is temporarily
suspended, there is, in my view, no basis for the order that still re-
mains in effect limiting the access of the plaintiff's camera-men and
reporters to a one-hour-per-day period.
Id
161 Id.
,-' Id. at 1185. The court also admonished the parties for failing to negotiate a
cooperative arrangement without resorting to legal avenues and the need for con-
stitutional principles.
163 148 Wis. 2d 532, 436 N.W.2d 285 (1989).
- Id. at 532, 436 N.W.2d at 293.
165 Id. at 532, 436 NW.2d at 286.
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airport's operating guidelines. 66
Relying upon Branzburg,16 7 Pell,168 and Houchins,169 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the reporter, as a
member of the press, had no right of access beyond that
of the public-the right to lawfully gather information.' 7 0
The court specifically refused to recognize that Richmond
Newspapers might afford the press any special access rights.
The court interpreted Richmond Newspapers as merely con-
firming a right of access for the public and the press to
criminal proceedings or courtrooms.' 7' The court distin-
guished an emergency site from a courtroom setting that
can be closely monitored and controlled. 7 2
The majority's reasoning, however, appeared inconsis-
tent in some areas. Although the decision stated that no
special right of access exists, the court emphasized that a
right of access had not been denied because other report-
ers were escorted to the scene shortly after the disorderly
conduct incident. Moreover, despite the court's insis-
tence that no constitutionally protected right existed, the
court conducted a balancing test in ruling that the govern-
ment's interest in maintaining order and attending to the
-, Id. at 532, 436 N.W.2d at 286-87. The court noted that the airport's "Media
Guide For Airport Emergencies" provided that "no representatives of the media
will be permitted to enter non-public/restricted areas of the airport without an
authorized escort." The guide also indicated that the airport's rationale for such
regulations was to "accommodat[e] between the news media's primary responsi-
bility to cover situations at the county's airport that at times are dramatic and of
major interest to the public and the airport staff's primary responsibility to con-
trol the situation and render emergency services as needed." Id. at 532, 436
N.W.2d at 287.
,67 For a discussion of the Branzburg case, see supra notes 13-20 and accompany-
ing text.
168 For a discussion of the Pell decision, see supra notes 22-28 and accompany-
ing text.
I - For a discussion of the Houchins case, see supra notes 42-55 and accompany-
ing text.
170 City of Oak Creek at 532, 436 N.W.2d at 291-93.
17, Id. at 532, 436 N.W.2d at 292. For a discussion of the Richmond Newspapers
decision, see supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
172 City of Oak Creek at 532, 436 N.W.2d at 292-93. "[T]here is a difference be-
tween an institution allowing news gatherers priority of access on its own accord,
in a setting in which the institution may closely control and monitor access, and
this court mandating access in an emergency situation." Id.
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needs of the injured outweighed the reporter's interest in
"beat[ing] out his competition" and meeting his
deadline. 75
The three-justice dissent, however, concluded that re-
porters may function as representatives for the public in
limited access situations. 74 The dissent stated that, in
this case, the defendant's conduct did not obstruct the
state's interests in safety, law enforcement, and medical
attention. 75 The dissent further recognized that the de-
fendant did not seek an unqualified right of access to the
accident scene. Rather, he sought access to an observa-
tion vantage point that would allow the gathering of infor-
mation about the accident and government operations
without interfering with emergency personnel's efforts to
protect the lives and property of the victims. 176 Further,
the dissent cited Richmond Newspapers for the implicit prop-
osition that the media could, in circumstances of limited
seating or space, act as surrogates for the public.' 77 Rely-
I" ld. The court further stated:
The defendant, here, chose to disregard the government's efforts to
establish order, set himself and his interest above the law, diluted
law enforcement efforts to assist those in need, and by so doing ele-
vated his own interest and concerns above the welfare of the persons
involved in the tragic accident and the government's efforts in its law
enforcement concerns.
Id. at 532, 436 N.W.2d at 293.
174 Id. at 532, 436 N.W.2d at 296 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
7'5 Id. at 532, 436 N.W.2d at 294. The dissent recognized:
The state has a significant interest in keeping people away from the
site of an accident or crime to expedite assisting victims, to preserve
evidence or to protect the public from injury... [but] the defendant
was not interfering with or obstructing emergency personnel and
that neither he nor other observers were in danger.
Id.
,76 Id. at 532, 436 N.W.2d at 296. The dissent suggested that the argument was
not:
that the government must always allow news gatherers access to an
accident scene. Rather the defendant ask[ed] [the] court to hold that
governmental personnel must give news gatherers access to a posi-
tion at an accident from which they can observe emergency person-
nel in action unless exclusion of news gatherers from all locations is
required to enable emergency personnel to perform their tasks.
Id.
'" Id. The dissent also stated:
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ing upon the press' role as the "eyes and ears" of the pub-
lic, the dissent urged that a special right of access to
limited space events, including accidents and disasters,
should exist.178
The cases presented in this section demonstrate that
courts generally concede that the press may have special
access rights in accident and disaster circumstances. Most
courts, however, tend to weigh governmental interests
more heavily than this right of access to uphold official
decisions made in emergency situations. As discussed be-
low, a state may provide additional protections for the
rights of the press.
C. State Protections of Access
In an apparently unique situation, California has en-
acted a statute that affords a special right of access for the
press to accidents and disasters. 79 In Leiserson v. City of
San Diego,'80 a television news cameraman filed an action
While the United States Supreme Court has not explicitly recog-
nized a constitutional protection for news gatherers' access to an ac-
cident scene, the Court has recognized that media representatives
serve as surrogates for the public. . . . Chief Justice Burger recog-
nized in the Richmond Newspapers case that government authorities
have allowed priority access to news gatherers in situations where
public access is limited by circumstances.
Id. See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text regarding the Richmond Newspa-
pers acknowledgment of the press' right of access in limited space situations.
178 City of Oak Creek at 532, 436 N.W.2d at 297.
'- A review of state laws reveals a general right to free speech and press, usu-
ally under a constitutional provision. But, only California appears to have ex-
tended protection to a statutory right of access to disasters and accidents. The
California statute sections pertinent to the discussion of statutory protections in-
clude the following:
(a) Whenever a menace to the public health or safety is created by a
calamity such as flood storm, fire, earthquake, explosion, accident,
or other disaster .... [peace] officers . . . may close the area where
the menace exists for the duration thereof by means of ropes, mark-
ers or guards to any and all persons not authorized by the... officer
to enter or remain within the enclosed area. ...
(d) Nothing in this section shall prevent a duly authorized represen-
tative of any news service, newspaper, or radio or television station
or network from entering the areas closed pursuant to this section.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 409.5(a),(d) (West 1990).
- 184 Cal. App. 3d 41, 229 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1986).
against the city and a police officer for violating the Cali-
fornia statute, which protected his right of access to an air
crash site that was closed to the public.' 8' Ajetliner and a
small private plane had collided in midair, crashing into a
residential area.18 2 While filming the crash site, the cam-
eraman was repeatedly told by officials to leave the scene.
Upon his failure to comply, police arrested the
cameraman. 1
83
Although the officers were unaware of the statutory
protection to which the press was entitled, officials had
designated a special press area closer to the site than the
area for nonpress bystanders. The officers knew of the
cameraman's status as an authorized media representa-
tive, but none of the officers informed the defendant of
the special area.8 4 Additionally, the arresting officers
were unaware that a question existed as to whether the
crash was criminally caused, which was important to the
court's ultimate holding.8 5
Safety was the only stated basis for the exclusion of the
cameraman. 8 6 Since the statute implicitly recognizes a
dangerous situation and still mandates access to the press,
exclusion of media personnel on that basis, according to
the court, represented an improper justification.8 7 Exclu-
sion, therefore, required some reason other than safety,
such as a reasonable expectation that interference with
emergency personnel would occur.'88 The city failed to
establish that interference would have occurred or that ac-
cess was restricted only to the extent necessary to prevent
to, Id. at 44-45, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
1 Id. at 44, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
- Id. at 45-46, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25. The arrest was subject to a local ordi-
nance criminalizing a failure to comply with the lawful order of a police officer. Id.
184 Id. at 44-46, 49, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 24-26, 28.
18-1 Id. at 44-49, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26, 28.
186 Id.
,8 Id. at 50, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
'" Id. at 50-51, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 28-29. The court said that it did "not believe
that in enacting section 409.5(d), the Legislature intended that media access be
unrestricted when the presence of reporters or photographers actually interferes
with the work of emergency crews." Id. at 51, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
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actual interference. The court, however, affirmed the de-
cision for the city because the press legitimately could be
excluded from the scene of a criminal investigation. The
validity of the exclusion was not negated by the arresting
officer's lack of personal knowledge as to the existence of
the criminal investigation. 8 9
A California Attorney General's opinion offered an ad-
ditional interpretation of the statute. The opinion ad-
dressed whether California Highway Patrol officers could
assist federal authorities in excluding all unauthorized
persons, including the media, from the crash scene of a
military airplane that possibly contained classified mate-
rial.'90 The Highway Patrol requested the opinion after
they were called upon to assist in securing the crash site of
an Air Force B-52 bomber. The state officers did not inde-
pendently decide to close the area but merely assisted the
federal authorities in excluding the media.' 9'
Under the Supremacy Clause, 9 2 federal statutory regu-
lations controlled the ruling.193 Arrests resulting from en-
try into a military crash site represent violations of federal
laws that prohibit the unauthorized entry into designated
military areas and the photographing of military equip-
'-, Id. at 53, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 30-3 1. Although the court posed a question as to
whether the scene of the crime exclusion was "a post hoc justification for an ex-
clusion order which was in reality based on reasonable, but nonetheless legally
erroneous, grounds," the court necessarily subjected the lower court ruling to a
substantial evidence standard of review that required an affirmation. Id. at 53, 229
Cal. Rptr. at 30. Also, the court noted that, recognizing the chain of command
within the police force, if a superior officer was aware of the criminal investigation
and issued orders thereunder, the lack of knowledge as to the reason for the ex-
clusion on the part of the arresting officer was irrelevant. Id.
1! 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 497 (1983). After a military aircraft crash, military per-
sonnel are instructed to cordon off an appropriate area around the scene to pro-
tect any classified materials from being compromised. Also, the restriction of
such site constitutes the establishment of a National Defense Area. 50 U.S.C.
§ 797 (1982). A statute also prohibits the photographing of vital military equip-
ment. 18 U.S.C. § 795 (1982). The vital military or naval installations or equip-
ment protected by the statutes are executively defined to include such items as
aircraft, engines, tools, equipment, maps, charts, books, etc. Exec. Order No.
10,104, 15 Fed. Reg. 598 (1950).
- 66 Op. Att'y Gen. at 497.
192 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
' For a discussion of the controlling statutory provisions, see supra note 190.
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ment. Thus, the media could not demand access under
the California statute that normally precludes their exclu-
sion from accident sites.' 94 Furthermore, the Attorney
General stated that the governmental interest in protect-
ing classified materials completely overrides any potential
right of access under the First Amendment. 9 5 In short, if
a Highway Patrol officer assisting federal authorities con-
fronts a party who is unlawfully at a military crash site or
photographing vital military equipment, the arrest would
not violate the California special access statute. 196
As originally stated, California's statutory right of ac-
cess to accident and disaster areas appears unique. Even
ignoring California's special protections, the state cases,
at a minimum, support the proposition that the press may
have special access rights to some accidents. The next
section uses the concepts and analyses from these acci-
dent cases to establish some guidelines to determine
when the press should be allowed access to air crash sites.
IV. SHOULD THE PRESS HAVE SPECIAL ACCESS RIGHTS
TO CRASH SITES?
The above evolution of case law supports the proposi-
tion that the press has a right of access to air crash sites.
This access right can be reasonably restricted, and the
Richmond Newspapers 197 balancing test aids in determining
the extent of that right. That is, by reviewing alternatives
to exclusion and weighing the governmental interests in
excluding the press from accident scenes against the value
of press access, guidelines emerge as to if and when offi-
cials should permit such access. When access is allowed,
officials must also assess whether all proposed restrictions
are reasonable. Therefore, this section outlines (1) the
- For a discussion of the California access protection statute, see supra note
179.
,95 66 Op. Att'y Gen. at 497.
' Id.
197 For a discussion of the Richmond Newspapers decision, see supra notes 62-74
and accompanying text.
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governmental interests involved in sealing a crash site, (2)
the reasons press access to the accident scene should be
protected, (3) the possible alternatives to exclusion, and
(4) whether various access limitations are reasonable.
A. Governmental Interests
An array of governmental interests exist. The protec-
tion of lives by ensuring prompt rescue and medical atten-
tion is one of the foremost reasons for excluding
members of the press who may inadvertently interfere
with the administration of aid. The safety of emergency
personnel and bystanders also leads to a need for exclu-
sion in cases in which fire, explosions, or related concerns
may arise. Space constraints also become critical in the
face of rendering aid to the injured when access routes
are limited, necessitating the exclusion of all nonessential
parties.
Security is also an important governmental interest.
The protection of the passengers' and crew's personal
property as well as any cargo may require restricted ac-
cess. Since one of the goals of an investigation into the
cause of a crash is the prevention of future accidents,
preservation of the scene of the crash for investigatory
purposes is a high priority governmental interest that may
mandate limiting entry onto the site.' 98
To a certain extent, limiting access to the crash area
may serve to protect the privacy and dignity of the victims
and their families. As acknowledged for the prisoners in
Houchins,'99 the privacy of air crash victims should not be
overlooked in an effort to protect First Amendment access
rights for the press. While newsgathering serves a very
important function in our governmental system, the vic-
tims and their families are entitled to retain a certain level
of dignity as they cope with the shocks and effects of the
tragedy.
'11" For a discussion of NTSB investigatory regulations and operating policies,
see supra note 158 and accompanying text.
'- For a discussion of Houchins, see supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
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B. Value of Press Access
The press and the public, on the other hand, also have
various interests in gaining a right of access to crash sites.
For example, as explained in Society of Professional Journal-
ists,200 access to the scene can bolster confidence in the
investigatory and corrective processes as well as provide
an emotional catharsis for the families and friends of miss-
ing persons or victims. The magnitude of an air crash dis-
aster and the sudden shock experienced by the victims'
families and friends result in a need for an emotional out-
let for a fairly large and widespread group. As the indi-
viduals cope with their grief, a strong need arises for
information about the victims and facts surrounding the
cause of the crash. Since a large portion of the general
public frequently travels by air and may have also exper-
ienced the unexpected loss of a relative or friend, the
public may closely identify with the crash victims and their
families. Emotional outlets, therefore, may be important
for the general public as well as for the victims' families
and friends.
Other public interests in protecting a right of access for
the press exist. Since spatial limitations will often pre-
clude open access to all concerned parties, the press, rec-
ognized as the representatives of the public under such
cases as Richmond Newspapers,2° ' should receive access to
fulfill the public's right to know. The NTSB, as explained
in City of Oak Creek,2°2 also advocates cooperation with the
media to avoid speculation and controversy while rescue,
salvage, and investigatory operations proceed.
Furthermore, courts recognize the public's increased
reliance upon the media to provide the information neces-
sary for them to ensure that no governmental abuses oc-
2- For a discussion of the Society of Professional Journalists decision, see supra
notes 112-133 and accompanying text.
20, For a discussion of the Richmond Newspapers decision, see supra notes 62-74
and accompanying text.
202 For a discussion of the City of Oak Creek decision, see supra notes 163-177 and
accompanying text.
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cur.20 3  Abuses could occur in the form of withheld
information as to the number of victims or other basic in-
formation about the flight. The cause of the crash in
terms of crew error, mechanical difficulties, or terroristic-
type origins could also be improperly withheld.2 0 4  Lim-
ited access will guard against abuses and serve to maintain
confidence in the airline industry as a whole.
C. Alternatives to Exclusion
Strong interests exist for advocating some exclusionary
practices by the government as well as for protecting the
press' right of access. While balancing these interests
against each other, alternatives must also be considered.
Acceptable alternatives to exclusion, however, are few.
The news decreases rapidly in quantity and significance as
the scene is cleared of victims and wreckage, and the value
of the information provided to the public to guard against
abuses becomes minimal. Although access to investiga-
tory hearings would provide information that might serve
some of the purposes of access, other functions, such as
emotional catharsis, prevention of speculation, and confi-
dence in the on-site corrective procedures, are inade-
quately served with stale information from a hearing. The
outcome of the balance will generally lie somewhere be-
tween total exclusion and unlimited access.
203 For a discussion of the public's reliance upon the media for information, see
supra notes 28, 67, and 81 and accompanying text.
204 It may be argued that crashes are sensationalized to increase newspaper
sales or the size of the viewer or listener audience, but even if this contention were
true, it does not negate the interests that support a need for access protections.
First, the dramatic nature of a crash will substantially achieve audience increases
without the use of misleading headlines or stories. Secondly, releasing informa-
tion in a prompt manner will diminish the number of initial inaccurate reports
regarding the cause of the crash. The NTSB acknowledges this control tactic by
encouraging cooperation to avoid undue speculation and controversy. Finally,
the control of governmental abuses is promoted by the press' independent inves-
tigation of official conduct. The potential for occasionally misleading headlines is
insufficient to overcome the public's right to secure as much information as possi-
ble to evaluate governmental activities. The press can be adequately controlled
through reasonable restrictions upon access in combination with the criminal and
civil liabilities that normally restrain reporter conduct. Competition in the mar-
ketplace also discourages false or inadequate investigative reporting.
D. Reasonable Restrictions
Total exclusion may be reasonable in some circum-
stances. National security interests may be implicated in
crashes involving military planes, such as the one de-
scribed in the California case above. 20 5 Also, if extreme
danger results from explosive cargo or similar conditions,
exclusion may be appropriate. Finally, the location of the
crash may be such that any admission of the media would
cause unavoidable interference with emergency person-
nel, thereby justifying exclusion.2 0 6  The normal crash
site, however, should not require total exclusion but
should only entail some limitations.
If total exclusion is not required, the next issue be-
comes whether any restrictions are necessary to reason-
ably protect governmental interests. For example, the
number of individuals admitted may legitimately need to
be limited. To determine who should be admitted, a satis-
factory method by which to identify who should be classi-
fied as a member of the press would be necessary.2 0 7 If
the number of qualified press members seeking access ex-
ceeds the available space, possible solutions to ensure
protection of press access rights include a standing press
pool, alternating periods of admission between reporters,
205 For a discussion of the effect of special statutory protections in California
upon military crash situations, see supra notes 190-196 and accompanying text.
206 For example, an Avianca jetliner crashed into a secluded, wooded area of
New York in January 1990. The area is served by only one road, which became
clogged within 45 minutes by designated emergency vehicles, unrequested rescue
companies, onlookers, and the press. Rescue operations were severely hampered
until the traffic jam was brought under control. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1990, at
31, col. 5
The Avianca crash, however, highlights public involvement in the governmental
process that may result from media coverage. The televised images of children
injured in the crash increased public support for a Federal Aviation Administra-
tion proposed rule requiring airlines to allow parents to purchase a separate ticket
for young children, enabling the use of a child-safety seat. The coverage also
improved parental awareness of the need to purchase child-restraint seats certi-
fied for air travel. Most airlines have voluntarily allowed the purchase of separate
tickets or the use of vacant seats to promote child safety. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 28,
1990, at 29, col. 1.
207 For a discussion of the problems related to identifying members of the
press, see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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or negotiating prearranged agreements between airports
and local media personnel.
If access to the site must be confined to one area, the
location of the observation area is crucial. As discussed in
City of Oak Creek,2 °8 the press is not demanding admission
to a point that would endanger lives by interference. A
controversy arises, however, when the press is denied a
sufficient vantage point from which newsgathers can com-
pile information. Since the press is acting as the public's
representative, the point should be closer than that al-
lowed other bystanders but not so close that it results in
interference.
Other governmental interests can also be protected
without total exclusion. If geographic constraints give
rise to an interference concern, the media could be ex-
cluded until aid has been rendered to those passengers
and crew members that suffered life-threatening injuries.
If a threat of fire or explosion exists, reporters could be
denied access until emergency personnel have resolved
the crisis.
The need to protect the privacy and dignity of the crash
victims, however, presents one of the more difficult issues.
As discussed above in Cable News Network,2 °9 the public in-
creasingly relies upon television coverage to attain their
information regarding governmental and other news-
worthy activities. Therefore, although exclusion of video
coverage would generally serve to protect the victims' pri-
vacy interests, it is doubtful that a court would uphold the
isolation and exclusion of broadcast journalists when
other reporters are admitted. 210 The interest in access
would appear to outweigh the governmental interest in
208 For a discussion of the City of Oak Creek case, see supra notes 163-177 and
accompanying text.
2- For a discussion of the Cable News Network decision, see supra notes 75-83 and
accompanying text.
2 0 Notwithstanding any potential limits on televising criminal proceedings, in-
creased reliance upon electronic media and the unique information provided by a
visual perspective would seem to discourage exclusion of broadcast personnel
from disaster scenes. See supra notes 81 and 111 and accompanying text.
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protecting privacy. The competitive forces of the market-
place and viewer or listener demands for dignified cover-
age in combination with the usual criminal and civil
liabilities governing press conduct must be relied upon to
exert pressure upon the media to respect the rights and
dignities of the victims and their families.
Finally, preservation of the investigation scene and pro-
tection of personal effects should not ordinarily require
restrictive measures. The function of the press in gather-
ing news for the public and the issuance of press creden-
tials should result in a presumption that members of the
media will not unwarrantedly interfere with rescue, sal-
vage, or investigatory operations at an accident scene.
Total exclusion or arrests should not occur unless the
press member has demonstrated that they will not operate
within this presumption. In short, although the Supreme
Court has yet to expressly acknowledge a special right of
access for the press, the case law seems to support a pre-
sumptive right of admission for the press under the First
Amendment, unless compelling governmental interests
require closing or limiting access to the accident scene.
V. CONCLUSION
Litigated cases of press exclusion from air crash sites
have infrequently arisen. Generally, airport and airline
personnel seek to disseminate information as rapidly as
possible to reduce fear and panic among parties related to
those on board the airplanes and to maintain confidence
in the consumer and financial markets. Consequently,
controversial exclusions are more likely when smaller air-
craft and airports are involved because of the absence of
sophisticated airline or airport media liaisons. In those
situations, market confidence is a relatively insignificant
factor and fewer passengers are involved.
The protection of the press' First Amendment rights,
however, should be equally important regardless of the
magnitude of the accident. A right to gather news under
the First Amendment currently exists, and although not
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yet acknowledged by the Supreme Court, a special im-
plied right of access to the scenes of crime and disaster
has been recognized by several lower courts. Further-
more, a method of analysis was established by Richmond
Newspapers.21 A balancing of the government's interests
in excluding the media against the value of protecting the
press' right of access is conducted in conjunction with a
review of alternatives to exclusion.
Several observations result from an analysis of the in-
terests in excluding the press from the scene of an air
crash. Specifically, the government has an interest in pro-
tecting lives, property, and investigatory evidence. On
the other hand, confidence in the investigation and airline
industry, emotional catharsis for the victim's relatives, and
ensuring that adequate information reaches the public to
enable them to monitor against governmental abuses are
some of the reasons for protecting the press' right of ac-
cess as agents of the public.
A clear rule does not emerge indicating that the press
should always be admitted. In fact, cases such as protec-
tion of military classified materials, avoidance of extreme
danger to the media, and prevention of unavoidable inter-
ference with emergency personnel may warrant total ex-
clusion. Generally, however, at least limited access
should be provided.
Access must include admission to an observation point
that allows sufficient newsgathering without interference,
but other reasonable restrictions are permissible. De-
pending upon the circumstances, requiring press creden-
tials and limiting the number of persons to be admitted
are some of the restrictions that may be acceptable. Ad-
mission may also be delayed when geographic constraints
or other short-term crises exist. Courts generally con-
strue the reasonableness of these restrictions in favor of
the officials because the decisions are made quickly and
during dire emergency situations.
", For a discussion of the Richmond Newspapers decision, see supra notes 62-74
and accompanying text.
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In summary, the press has a right to gather news that is
protected under the First Amendment as well as an im-
plied right of access that has generally been extended to
accident sites, and this right is qualifiable by reasonable
restrictions that are essential to the promotion of govern-
mental interests in protecting lives, property, and investi-
gatory procedures.
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